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How Can Taiwan Enter the United Nations?: Implications of the ROC's Quest 
for International Recognition 
Vincent Wei-<:heng Wang 
Most existing literature on the issue of Taiwan's admittance into the United 
Nations (UN) focuses on why Taiwan should have a seat in the UN, by invoking the 
UN's principle of universality. This paper focuses on how: the strategies and 
approaches. 1 
The government of the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan has so far adopted an 
open-ended yet passive strategy. In 1993 it knocked on the UN's door for the first 
time since 1971, when the People's Republic of China (PRC) replaced it in the UN. 
Taiwan requested seven Central American states to ask the UN to create an ad hoc 
committee to report to the General Assembly about the special case of Taiwan. In 
1994, 1995, and 1996 similar proposals were put forth, endorsed by a slightly 
increasing number of member states who maintain diplomatic ties with the ROC. 
However, each year that the ad hoc committee proposal came before the General 
Committee, the PRC used its clout to keep the item off the agenda, although there 
had been considerable debate over that item. In light of these setbacks, some 
rethinking is beneficial. This paper will discuss several prerequisites for Taiwan's 
UN bid, analyze the various models for Taiwan, and evaluate the various approaches 
to entry. The discussions will also have some implications for the ROC's 
membership in other international organizations, and for the ROC's quest for a 
higher international status in general. 
Prerequisites 
1. Diplomatic recognition 
Some prerequisites will facilitate Taiwan's UN bid. First, a UN bid will have a 
much more realistic chance when more states have diplomatic relations with 
Taiwan. The bottom line is politics: the PRC got enough votes in 1971, so it was 
seated. When Taiwan has enough votes, it will be admitted. Substantive relations, 
however strong, are no substitute for diplomatic relations. Taiwan's departure from 
the UN in 1971 presaged many countries' shift of recognition. Conversely, a 
resolution on Taiwan's status by the UN would herald other states' diplomatic 
reassessments. This is perhaps why the government's stance is to hope that the UN 
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will study a solution that is acceptable to most members. But this is not enough to 
satisfy the domestic constituencies. 
2. A Plebiscite 
Instead of asking the UN to decide how Taiwan could join, Taiwan should first 
decide how it wants to join the UN. A national debate, albeit divisive, is inevitable. 
So the second prerequisite is a plebiscite on this issue.2 A plebiscite, or expression 
of national self-determination, is an exercise of the "elementary right" ofa people to 
decide their legitimate ruler, and has been an internationally well-established 
democratic practice. 3 It is not enough for the government to proclaim a consensus, 
because there is none. And since the UN issue is emotionally intertwined with 
Taiwan's fundamental identity dilemma--unification or independence--eventually it 
must be resolved in one way or another. In fact, it may be beneficial for the 
government to conduct a plebiscite. Most opinion polls (and inferences from 
election results) show that a large majority of people in Taiwan favors the status 
quo--neither open declaration of independence nor immediate reunification with the 
mainland. A formal plebiscite would presumably reflect this fact. 
Such a plebiscite should further affirm that the ROC is the only legitimate 
government on Taiwan and the associated islands. This proclamation, although a 
seeming departure from the arcane "one China" stance, would provide a legal 
pretext to avert the PRC's claim to Taiwan, and open the door for other states' 
recognition (of this fact). 4 The Ddmocractic Progressive Party (DPP) has for years 
advocated a plebiscite (on legitimate independence), and the government could in 
effect pre-empt it and win on this issue. It seems that only a plebiscite, allowing all 
voters to decide on the name and approach of Taiwan's UN participation, could 
form a genuine national consensus--a pact which no party could argue further about. 
Perhaps most importantly, results from a plebiscite would unambiguously signify 
to the UN and the world the real wishes of the people on Taiwan, and quite simply, 
make those wishes less likely to be ignored. After all, the principle of national self 
determination is not entirely dead. If the UN can monitor the election of Eritrea 
(formerly a part of Ethiopia), respect its people's wishes, and accept it as a member, 
and if the UN can accept so many separate members resulting from the breakup of 
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the former Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia, and accept the division of the former 
Czechoslovakia, how could it justify denying the same to the 21 million people on 
Taiwan? In fact, numerous plebiscites have been conducted in recent years: in West 
Irian, the Cook Islands, Equatorial Guinea, Okinawa, and several of the U.S. Pacific 
Islands. Had the vote for Quebec to secede from Canada passed in 1995, both 
Canada and the UN would most likely have accepted it. 
3. The China factor 
Taiwan's UN bid would be completely effortless, if the PRC did not negate it. In 
fact, the PRC has constantly forced states or international organizations to choose 
between Beijing and Taipei. Given Beijing's veto power in the UN, its nuclear 
weapons, and growing might, the choice has usually been politically easy: Beijing. 
In recent years, Taipei has started to pursue "dual recognition" which means that 
Taipei will exchange formal ties with a state, so long as it recognizes Taipei, 
regardless of its ties with Beijing. But so far there has been no enduring precedent. 
So the third prerequisite for Taiwan's UN bid is for it to to improve relations with 
Beijing. It may be an exaggeration to say that "The road to the UN is through 
Beijing," although most countries would probably favor a Beijing-Taipei negotiated 
solution to this problem. But clearly, without Beijing's acquiescence, Taipei's quest 
for international identity will continue to be extremely problematic. 
Unfortunately, Beijing still clings to outmoded concepts of sovereignty. It has 
steadfastly maintained that the so-called "Taiwan issue" is China's domestic affair. 
This is a dangerous stance for Taiwan, because in international law there is a long-
established principle of non-interference in internal affairs. If Taiwan's future is an 
international issue, it should be protected by the principle of peaceful resolution of 
conflicts. 5 However, if it is an internal matter, as the PRC has claimed, only the 
PRC's goodwill can guarantee Taiwan's security-and that is hardly dependable. So 
the UN bid also has enormous security implications for Taiwan. There is also no 
wonder at the reasons for the PRC's strenuous opposition to it. The PRC even 
equates Taiwan's UN bid (and President Lee Teng-hui's "pragmatic diplomacy") as 
a ploy to seek independence; hence, a justification for using force against Taiwan. 
Since President Lee's visit to the U.S. in June 1995, the PRC has greatly escalated 
its military provocations (missile tests and military exercises), aimed at intimidating 
Taiwan and influencing the island's first popular direct presidential election on 23 
March 1996. It has also increased diplomatic pressure on Taiwan: in late 1996, 
South Africa, Taiwan's most important ally, decided to cancel diplomatic ties with 
Taipei in favor of Beijing. No one fantasizes that Taiwan's UN bid will not face 
strong opposition from Beijing. However, Taipei must still be resolute in pursuing a 
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goal that is crucial to its own security and prosperity. It will take education, 
patience, economic enticement, and military preparedness on the part of Taipei to 
convince Beijing of the reality of a Taiwan separate from the mainland. The rise of 
independence sentiment in Taiwan has, ironically, largely been contributed to by 
Beijing's intransigence. fry giving Taiwan more room internationally, Beijing could 
in fact expect a more confident Taiwan, more willing to seek rapprochement and 
less compelled ta seek independence. 
4. The U.S. factor 
A final catalyst is U.S. support. It was the Nixon Administration's policy that led 
to the "diplomatic stampede" of countries recognizing the PRC, which precipitated 
the ROC's rapid descent.6 Following the U.S. example, the world has settled into 
diplomatic complacency: maintaining formal ties with Beijing, and informal ties 
with Taipei. . In fact, the world community faces a classic "collective action" 
problem in dealing with Taiwan. That is, if each country deals with the PRC 
bilaterally, it is always compelled to choose Beijing over Taipei (the lure of a market 
of ~me billion consumers, however poor at present, UN Security Council veto power, 
nuclear weapons) and thus to go along with Beijing's "one China" policy, which 
perpetuates Taiwan's plight. But if all countries collectively took a strong stand 
against Beijing over the Taiwan issue, then they might succeed. The obvious issue 
is, who that "political entrepreneur" willing to bear the costs of ensuring the public 
good, will be. In other words, who will provide the leadership necessary to 
overcome Beijing's opposition? The answer should be: the U.S., with its 
tremendous power and prestige in international organizations. The U.S. may have 
only one vote in the General Assembly, but it has a veto in the Security Council. In 
organs adopting weighted voting, such as the World Bank, the U.S. has 33% of the 
vote. If the U.S. really wants, it can help seat Taiwan in international organizations, 
including the UN. In fact, the U.S. has done that in the cases of the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, 
and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 
An in-depth analysis of the U.S. role in Taiwan's UN efforts is beyond the scope of 
this paper. I can only briefly address the clear division of opinions on this issue. An 
increasing number of people in Congress favor a more active role that the U.S. could 
and should assume in helping Taiwan obtain a seat in the UN. 7 Understandably, the 
executive branch does not support Taiwan's UN cause, arguing that it would harm 
U.S.-China relations. However, it pledges to support Taiwan's membership in 
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international organizations that allow non-states to join.8 Further, the Taiwan 
Relations Act, the U.S. law enacted in the aftennath of its de-recognition, passed to 
maintain and enhance relations between the U.S. and Taiwan, mandates the U.S. 
government to support Taiwan's membership in international organiz.ations, 
especially financial ones. 9 
Models 
Regarding the capacity of Taiwan in the UN, six models can be compared. Note, 
however, that these models are mainly heuristic devices, created to stimulate 
thinking and discourse. 
The first model is the exclusive representation model (i.e., reversing Resolution 
2758): seeking to replace the PRC in the UN as the only representative of China. 
This is not only impossible but also undesirable, because it would unjustly exclude 
1.17 billion people. 
The second model is the new state model: applying to the UN as a new state (e.g., 
the Republic of Taiwan). As much as DPP idealists preach this, it is also impossible, 
because (1) the PRC would veto it, and (2) Taiwan cannot get two-thirds of the votes 
in the General Assembly. 
The third model is the German I Korean model: parallel representations for both 
the PRC and the ROC (i.e., a "two Chinas" fonnula). This is the ROC government's 
preference. 
The fourth model is the ADB/ APEC model: coexistence of one "China, People's 
Rep. of' and one "Taipei, China" (i.e., a "one China, one Taiwan" formula).10 
Presently this may be Taiwan's best hope. However, whether such an improvised 
arrangement can lead to a diplomatic breakthrough for Taiwan is a big question: For 
instance, how can other states recognize "Taipei, China" or "Chinese Taipei" as a 
state? 
The fifth model is the Soviet Union model: multiple representations yet one central 
government. To forestall the U.S. 's predominance in the UN at the time of its 
founding, the Soviet Union insisted in having two more seats in the UN (Belarus 
and Ukraine; however, neither could conduct foreign policy). This might be 
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Beijing's eventual offer (in essence a "one countty, two systems" model). 11 
The last model is the Vietnam model: one seat for one unified countty. Should 
one day the PRC rule Taiwan, it could claim to represent the people of Taiwan. The 
claim that there is no need to have more than one representation is the PRC's 
current position, obviously an unpopular one in Taiwan. 
At the present time, the "bargaining set" or feasible outcomes are really between 
the fourth and fifth models. Frankly, the fourth model is not all bad, since it would 
allow Taiwan to participate in the international community, although not quite 
equally. But even this narrow set contains much room for creativity. Furthermore, 
if international politics should continue to evolve in Taiwan's favor, then the third or 
even the second model become possible. It is to be hoped that a solution can be 
found to satisfy Taiwan's yearning for dignified international participation, China's 
concern about "face," and accinidate the international community's real need to 
incorporate Taiwan, an increasingly important actor on the world scene, 
simultaneously. 
Approaches 
Finally, I will discuss three approaches to participation, each with differing 
degrees of effectiveness and problems: (1) seeking entty to the General Assembly, 
(2) seeking Observer status, and (3) participating in UN programs and affiliated 
organs. These three approaches are not mutually exclusive; rather, they should be 
used in tandem or in sequence. 
1. The General Assembly 
First, knocking on the door of the General Assembly directly, the "front door" 
approach, has the advantage of driving home the issue. However, current politics in 
the UN and Taiwan's setbacks in the last four years suggest that Assembly 
membership may be the fruit, rather than the catalyst, of a long, fortuitous process. 
In addition, repeated setbacks may further frustrate Taiwan's people and put more 
pressure on the government. Still, this approach is worth pursuing with care, since 
it keeps the issue alive. The more the international society knows about yet cannot 
solve this problem, the more it will feel ashamed and obligated to do so. Time is on 
Taiwan's side. 
An interesting strategy under the "front door'' approach -- repealing Resolution 
2758 - is suggested by John Bolton. Condemning 2758 as illegal, he dispels the 
myth that resolutions adopted by one UN General Assembly plenary session cannot 
be repealed by another. He cites the repealing in 1991 of the 1975 Resolution 3379 
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(i.e., "Zionism is racism"). He argues that since this strategy essentially means for 
the General Assembly to correct its own mistake, because re-recognizing the ROC's 
representatives is not the admission of new states, it does not involve the Security 
Council (thus a possibility of a PRC veto). He argues that repealing 2758 is a 
prerequisite for reinstating the miscanied "dual representation" scheme of 1971.12 
2. Observer Status 
The UN has given "observer status" to four types of entities, which entitles them to 
participate in all plenary and other UN meetings without the right to vote, as well as 
to attend UN-organized conferences: (I) states that are not UN members (e.g., 
Switzerland, the Holy See), (2) liberation movements (e.g., the Palestinian 
Liberation Organiz.ation), (3) intergovernmental organiz.ations (e.g., the 
Organiz.ation of African Unity), and (4) specialized agencies (e.g., the International 
Atomic Energy Agency).13 
Observer status has the advantage of giving Taiwan (an incomplete) representation 
yet avoids challenging Beijing's sovereignty. Switzerland, Monaco, the Holy See, 
East Germany, West Germany, North Korea, South Korea, and the PLO, at one time 
or another, have all been Observers at the UN. As an Observer, Taiwan would gain 
the opportunity to address issues important to it, but it could not vote. There is no 
question when Palestinians one day have their own state, they will want a full 
Member, not just an Observer, status. So this is really a transitional and 
unsatisfactory arrangement. But if such a status were granted to Taiwan, Taiwan 
should not reject it. 
Based on his study of sixteen UN observer cases, James C. Hsiung finds that the 
UN Secretary-General, upon an application for observer status, has almost sununary 
right to make a final decision. In all past cases, when the Secretary-General asked 
the General Assembly for a retroactive review following a decision he had made, the 
Assembly invariably accepted his decision. However, Hsiung argues that this route 
is now closed for Taiwan, because the PRC, following Taiwan's aborted "study 
committee" endeavor in 1993, went straight to the former UN Secretary-General 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali and served him notice that the PRC would object, pre hoc to 
Taiwan's entry in any form, including that of an observer.14 
31 
How Can Taiwan Enter the United Nations? 
3. UN Programs and Affiliated Organizations 
In contrast to the "front door'' approach described above, Taiwan could first join 
the UN through the "back door," i.e., through UN programs, or specialized agencies 
and autonomous organizations within the UN system .. This incremental approach, 
though less flamboyant, should not be discounted. The UN stands at the hub of a 
network of specialized international bodies. Some of these are operated directly by 
the UN General Assembly, some are fonnally affiliated with the UN but 
autonomous; some are unconnected with the UN. Despite their publicity (or 
notoriety), the General Assembly and the Security Council are really not where the 
action of our daily lives takes place. It is these numerous functional organs that 
weave together people across national boundaries into a truly interdependent world .. 
UN Programs are overseen by the General Assembly through the Economic and 
Social Council in order to advance economic development and social stability in 
poor Third World states. The funding of these programs comes partly from the 
General Assembly and partly from contributions of member states, businesses, or 
even private charities. If the PRC were to object to Taiwan's proposal, for example, 
to donate $1 million every year to the UNICEF's Children's Emergency Fund for 
vaccinating Third World children against diseases (a purely humanitarian measure), 
it would undoubtedly make enemies for the PRC and win friends for Taiwan. 
Presently Third World states constitute more than two-thirds of the UN 
membership, so gaining support from this key ''voting bloc" .is critical to Taiwan's 
UN bid. Also, the decisions of the General Assembly on representation are 
advisory, but not binding, on these specialized agencies, where the bulk of UN's 
daily work is carried on. This is even more true of the autonomous agencies. They 
are masters of their own houses, and have different requirements for membership: 
some allow non-UN members, or even non-states. 
At least a dozen UN-affiliated organizations permit non-UN members to join: the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO), the Food. and Agricultural 
Organization (FAO), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the 
International Labor Organization (ILO), the International Telecommunications 
Union (ITU), the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), 
the Universal Postal Union (UPU), the World Health Organization (WHO), the 
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the World Meteorological 
Organization (WMO), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank (IBRD). All except IMF 
and IBRD permit automatic membership for UN members who wish to join. 
In light of this, it is very appropriate for Taiwan, as a key economic power, after 
its accession to the WTO, to join the World Bank and the IMF - and it is also 
proper for the U.S. to support Taiwan's entry into these international financial 
bodies. In fact, the weighted voting system in these bodies (as opposed to the one-
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state-one-vote system in the UN) can further augment Taiwan's influence. Taiwan 
will be a major donor, and will benefit many borrowing nations, including the PRC! 
It is in these "low-profile" yet practical bodies where Taiwan should immediately 
begin seeking positive participation. After all, Taiwan has been missing from the 
international scene for too long. And with its admirable economic success and 
political democratization, Taiwan will play a very influential role in these bodies, 
establish a positive reputation, accumulate goodwill and support, and coincidentally 
foster a separate identity (as perceived by others) from Beijing's. 
Aside from its Security Council seat and veto, Beijing is really not a major player 
in the UN. It adopts a very low profile in the General Assembly, and is hardly 
visible at all in the technical and specialized agencies. In fact, it is the major 
recipient of loans and grants from the IMF and the IBRD. For the PRC to block 
Taiwan's entry into the IMF and the IBRD is like for the borrower to dictate from 
whom the bank can receive money. The PRC contributed just 0.77% of UN's 
budget in 1993 ! 15 - and that figure did not even include membership dues for the 21 
million "compatriots" on Taiwan. 
By taking this three-pronged strategy, emphasizing the third approach while also 
pursuing the other two, Taiwan should see its international stature greatly improve 
and the world more ready to embrace it ill a few years. The way to the UN may be 
long and arduous, at least there is not just one road and the end seems to be in sight. 
The Cold War is over, and this last remnant of the Cold War must also eventually be 
swept away. It is time to invite Taiwan, a prosperous and democratic nation, to the 
larger family of nations. 
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· For several recent books on the increasing use of direct democracy to decide 
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Butler & A. Ranney (Eds.) (1994). Referendums around the world: The 
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However, such a declaration did not stipulate that only the ROC, and 
not any other country including the PRC, has jurisdiction over Taiwan 
and the associated islands. This is why a plebiscite must establish this 
claim. 
s. Chapter VI of the UN Charter mandates that parties to a dispute should seek 
"pacific settlement of disputes." One legal expert has pointed out that 
action taken under Chapter VI can proceed unhindered by the PRC, 
because Article 27(3) stipulates that "in decisions under Chapter 
VI ... a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting." The Security 
Council could thus use a wide range of peaceful means (even 
stationing peace-keeping forces on Taiwan) in response to a PRC 
attack on Taiwan. D. Scheffer (1993). International legal implications 
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